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The End of Freedom of the Seas?: Grotius,
Law of the Sea, and Island Building
DANIELLE KROON*

I.

Introduction

In 1608, a short work by Hugo Grotius entitled Mare Liberum was
published,' the title translating to "freedom of the seas." At the time of
publication, the author was anonymous, but the full title of the work (in
English) gave away its purpose: "The Freedom of the Seas or The Right
Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in the East Indian Trade."2 This
was effectively a legal brief intended to address a specific legal dispute, but
the influence of this document has far exceeded its original purpose. The
underlying principle-that no country may own the seas-has shaped the
development of modern law of the sea and remains a fundamental principle
that continues to guide development for ongoing law of the sea issues as they
arise. This paper will consider the Grotian conception of freedom of the
seas, as applied to the controversial modern activity of island building.
Technological advances have provided for developments in this area that
were not envisioned at the time of Grotius, nor even fully realized at the
time of the establishment of critical modern law of the sea treaties. This is
inevitable; technological advances will require discussion about the best
means of regulating the new subject matter and activities. When discussing
new issues, the fundamental Grotian principle of freedom of the seas is
continually referred to as a means of framing the discourse: no country may
own the seas. Although there have been debates about the rights of coastal
states and jurisdiction on the high seas, the fundamental principle of
freedom of the seas remains enshrined as the opposing principle for
proposed limitations.
* Solicitor, Litigation team at Marque Lawyers, Sydney; LLM (International Legal Studies,
Jerome Lipper Award recipient)(NYU); BA, LLB (Hons I) (Macquarie University). Thank you
to Professor Robert Howse for his guidance and assistance in drafting this paper, any errors are
of course my own.
1. Throughout this paper, the following English translation of the text was used: HUGO
GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO

TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE (James Brown Scott ed., Ralph Van Deman Magoffin
trans., Oxford University Press, 1916) (1633) (translation of MARE LIBERUM, SIVE DE JURE
QUOD BATAVIS COMPETIT AD INDICANA COMMERCIA DISSERTATIO).

2. HUGO

GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE

AND OF NATIONS

Ac

title page (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901) (1625) (translation of DE JURE

PACIS).
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Section II of this paper will seek to place Grotius's Mare Liberum in the
appropriate historical context and discuss the purpose and motivation for his
work. This will allow for a more well-reasoned analysis of his fundamental
arguments, their justification, and their relevance for modern law of the sea.
Section III will explore the ideas of Grotius as outlined in Mare Liberum,
considering the various issues raised within the overall argument about
freedom of the seas. It will also critically analyze the justifications that
support his overarching thesis that no country may own the seas, and the
subsequent acceptance of this concept in international law. Section TV will
consider modern law of the sea, and expansions within that body of law that
encroach upon the underlying idea of freedom of the seas. It will explore the
underlying tension in modern law of the sea between coastal state rights and
freedom of the seas, briefly noting examples of how this has been addressed.
Section V will discuss the specific activity of island building, as an example of
a modern issue in law of the sea that potentially infringes upon the concept
of freedom of the high seas. This will outline current factual examples of
island building, the international response to such activities, and the
applicable law currently governing the regime of islands. Section VI will
analyze what island building activities mean for law of the sea and the
underlying Grotian principle of law of the sea. Section VII will conclude by
arguing that island building does not represent a fundamental change in
conceptualizing law of the sea and reinforce the need to maintain freedom of
the seas within modern law of the sea.
II.

Placing Grotius in Context

In order to analyze the Grotian conception of freedom of the seas, it is
important to first place Grotius and his work, Mare Liberum, in the
appropriate historical and philosophical context. He was not the first
scholar or politician to consider the legal status of the oceans; in fact,
Grotius specifically relies upon the writings of previous philosophers and
statesman to justify his arguments. 3 Nor did Grotius set out to provide a
philosophical justification for freedom of the seas simply as an intellectual or
academic pursuit. Mare Liberum was a very focused project, with a clear
intent: it was a legal argument based on an actual case. 4 The first sentence in
Chapter I clearly states his "intention is to demonstrate briefly and clearly
that the Dutch-that is to say, the subjects of the United Netherlands-have
the right to sail to the East Indies, as they are now doing, and to engage in
trade with the people there."5 But, despite the underlying purpose of Mare
Liberum, it has been stated that the principle "constitutes one of the pillars of

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 7.
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the law of the sea and stands at the beginning of modern international law."6
To understand why this document, which was intended to provide support
for a legal argument in a dispute, had such a significant impact on modern
law of the sea, it is important to outline the background of Grotius, and
examine the purpose and historical context of his work, Mare Liberum. It is
then possible to ensure that subsequent analysis is framed within the
appropriate context.
A.

HUGO GROTIUS

Hugo Grotius has been described as the "father of international law,"7 the
"founder of the science of international law,"s and the "father of the modern
law of nations."9 These titles have been contested, 10 and it would be
inaccurate to describe one man as being solely responsible for the modern
conception of international law, but it is unquestionable that Grotius was an
influential writer that shaped international law. Born in the Netherlands in
1583, Grotius commenced university at age eleven, travelled to France as
part of a diplomatic delegation at age fifteen, and received a doctor of laws at
age sixteen." He worked as a practicing lawyer in the Netherlands, was
involved in politics, and became the attorney-general of the Netherlands at
age twenty-four.2 From this impressive background, Grotius wrote
3
extensively about various topics, including the publication of sixty books.

In his writing, he considered the concept of a law of nations or an
international society, most notably within his influential work On the Law of
War and Peace;'4 and the influence of his work is still being considered by
international law academics today.5 It is important to consider the
6. Riidiger Wolfrum, The Freedom of Navigation: Modern Challenges Seen from a Historical
Perspective, in LAW OF THE SEA, FROM GROTIUS TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
LAW OF THE SEA 89, 89 (Lilian del Castillo ed., 2015).
7.See, e.g., Jesse S. Reeves, The Life and Work uf Hugo Grotius, 19 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
48, 57-58 (1925); J. Alan Beesley, Grotius and the New Law, 18 OCEAN Y.B. 98, 100 (2004).
8. Amos S. Hershey, History of InternationalLaw Since the Peace of Westphalia, 6 AM. J. OF
INT'L L. 30, 30 (1912).

9. M.C.W. Pinto, Hugo Grotius and the Law of the Sea, in LAW

OF THE SEA, FROM GROTIUS

19 (Lilian del Castillo ed.,
2015).
10. R. W. Lee, Hugo Grotius: 1588-1645, 62 L. Q. REV. 53, 56 (1946); Benedict Kingsbury, A
Grotian Tradition of Theory and Practice: Grotius, Law, and Moral Skepticism in the Thought of
Hedley Bull, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 3, 9 (1997).
11. James G. Apple & Christine E. White, Hugo Grotius, AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L LAW & THE
INT'L JUDICIAL ACADEMY (Oct./Nov. 2007), http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_1007/
leadingfigures.html.
TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 18,

12. Yasuaki Onuma, Hugo Grotius,

ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA

www.britannica.com/biography/Hugo-Grotius;

(Nov. 15, 2017), https://

Andrew Blom, Hugo Grotius,

INTERNET

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2017), http://www.iep.utm.edu/grotius/.

13. Apple & White, supra note 11.
14. GROTIUS, supra note 1.

15. See, e.g., John MacDonell, Transactions of the Grotius Society, 5 PROBLEMS
WAR xvii, xxii (1919).
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background, influences, and purpose of Grotius-and how these factors
shaped his perspective and overall argument-when discussing and
analyzing Grotian concepts. Grotius was not a philosopher that considered
international relations, laws, and governing principles from the perspective
of an outsider, analyzing the system purely in the realm of thought.16
Grotius was firmly rooted in the realm of realism: his background in politics,
law, and international relations meant that his analysis and arguments were
driven and influenced by a pragmatic perspective.'
B.

MARE LIBERUM

Given the extensive publishing history of Grotius, it is important to
understand the context of the specific work referenced, Mare Liberum. This
work was first published anonymously in 1608, and it was only revealed in
1868 that Mare Liberum was originally Chapter XII of a larger treatise
entitled De ]ure Praedae (On the Law of Prize and Booty), written by
Grotius between 1604 and 1605.18 This particular work arose from a factual
dispute: Grotius was retained by the Dutch East India Company after one of
its ships captured a Portuguese galleon in 1602.19 At the heart of this dispute
was the claim by Portugal of ownership or control of the Indian Ocean and
Atlantic Ocean south of Morocco, and the assertion of a right to exclude all
foreigners from navigating or entering those waters. 20 The purpose of Mare
Liberum was to refute the claim made by Portugal that it had a right to
exclude foreigners, or restrict navigation, in a specific portion of the high
seas.2' In the first chapter, Grotius clearly states that he bases his argument
on the "most specific and unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations,
called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of which is self-evident and
immutable, to wit: [e]very nation is free to travel to every other nation, and
to trade with it."22 The purpose of Mare Liberum was not a purely
philosophic exercise, unlike some of his notable later work, but is framed
more appropriately "in the nature of a brief."23 It was effectively a legal
document: Grotius put forward an argument for his client, and argued to
support that opinion by justifying a principle of law favorable to the position
of his client.24
16. GROutS, supra note 1, at vi.
17. Apple & White, supra note 11.
18. HUGO

GROutS, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND

BooTY i (Martine Julia van

Ittersum ed., 2006) (1603) (translation and introduction of DE JURE PRAEDAE).
19. Hugo Grotius, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/
entry/HugoGrotius#Works (last visited Nov. 6, 2018); see also GROTIoS, supra note 1, at vi.
20. See, e.g., MICHAEL PEARSON, THE INDIAN OCEAN 122-23 (2003); Benjamin Straumann, Is
Modern Liberty Ancient - Roman Remedies and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius's Early Works on
Natural Law, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 55, 66-67 (2009).
21. GROTIUS, supra note 1.
22. Id.
23. Id.at vi.
24. Id. at vi-vii.
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To understand Mare Liberum, it is important to consider both the man
behind it and the reason for its creation. Grotius was a scholar, a legal
practitioner, and involved in politics and international relations from a
young age. 25 He was in a position that allowed him to understand the more
complex issues involved in international relations and frame an argument
that came from both practical and theoretical experience. But this particular
work was not simply an intellectual pursuit seeking to make a normative
argument as to what the fundamental principle should be. This was a
directed and purposeful work that made a legal argument to support the
position of a real-world party to a dispute; and therefore, the justification is
more appropriately framed as supporting the position of his client by
establishing a positive argument as to what the law actually was at the time
that this was written. This is an important distinction: one purpose is to
defend a position as to what the law actually was, and the other is to establish
a justification and rationale for what the law should be.
III.

Fundamental Grotian Principles

Bearing in mind the historical context of Mare Liberum, it is important to
then analyze the principles it seeks to establish, the justification for those
principles, and the reception in terms of political acceptance and subsequent
academic writing. The work is largely divided into two areas-freedom of
navigation and freedom of trade-whereby Grotius seeks to disprove
Portuguese claims of exclusivity by establishing these freedoms as part of the
Law of Nations.26 It is worth noting that the arguments are similar in
relation to both freedoms, and that Grotius states that claims by Portugal in
relation to trade will "be refuted by practically all the same arguments" as
were used in relation to freedom of navigation.27 The main focus for the
purpose of this paper relates to his argument that "navigation is free to all
persons whatsoever."28 It is this freedom of navigation that has shaped
modern law of the sea; it is now an entrenched principle. Although there
have been restrictions and qualifications placed upon it, this idea is still the
opposing argument in the standard of discourse when states seek to limit the
freedom of navigation for their own purposes.
To establish his claim, Grotius had to first disprove that Portugal has
sovereign rights over the East Indies, and that the sea in question does not
and cannot belong to them.29 He did this by countering all potential
arguments that could be made to establish such ownership, effectively
proving his argument by establishing that there was no possible justification
that Portugal could rely upon to succeed.30 In relation to the East Indies, he
25. Apple & White, supra note 11.
26. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 7-11.
27. Id. at 61.

28. Id. at 7.
29.

GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 11-13.
30. Id. at 11-14.
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addressed and sought to disprove sovereignty by way of title of discovery,
"Papal Donation," or title of war. 31 In relation to potential exclusive rights
to the sea, he addressed potential tide of occupation, Papal Donation, and
title by prescription or custom. 32 Acknowledging that these are largely legal
arguments specific to the facts and dispute in question, it is important to
then delve further into the work and consider the principles relied upon to
support this position.
C.

NATURAL LAW AND DIVINE LAW

Grotius relies upon natural law throughout his work, stating that the "law
by which our case must be decided is not difficult to find, seeing that it is the
same among all nations; and it is easy to understand, seeing that it is innate
in every individual and implanted in his mind . . . [f]or it is a law derived
from nature." 33 This is demonstrated by reliance on the statements of
previous scholars and politicians, which Grotius uses to justify his claim that
4
certain practice or ideas are custom, or a common rule among all mankind.3
There is also a theme of divine law and religion throughout his work, which
is in many ways a reflection of the period in which Grotius was writing.35
This means that Grotius is able to refer to God as a "founder and ruler of
the universe, "36 or "King of the universe." 37 By creating a supreme ruler, or
world ruler, Grotius is able to overcome a problem that plagues modern
international law-the fact that there is no higher authority above all
sovereign states capable of creating and enforcing a body of law.38 Further,
Grotius establishes a conceptual tribunal that governs international
relations, being the two tribunals of "[c]onscience, or the innate estimation
of oneself, and [p]ublic [o]pinion, or the estimation of others," 39 meaning
that Grotius is seeking to make his case by persuading Portugal itself, and to
sway public opinion, in favor of his argument. It is the reliance on natural
law and divine law that shapes the style of justification and argument made
by Grotius.
D.

CUSTOM

Grotius consistently refers to the idea that there are certain things that
"by the [l]aw of [n]ations or by [c]ustom are common to all,"40 and seeks to
31. Id. at 15-17, 45-46, 66.
32. Id. at 22, 47-50, 52.
33. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 5.
34. Id. at 8-11
35. Gary Edmond, The Freedom of Histories: Reassessing Grotius on the Sea, 2 LAW TEXT
CULTURE 179, 194-95 (1995).
36. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 1.
37. Id. at 3.
38. See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How
WE USE IT 1 (1994).
39. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 3.
40. Id. at 9.
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justify his argument by proving that particular principles or ideas are custom
based on historical practice or statements. In many ways, this could be
interpreted as similar to customary law, a recognized source of modern
international law, 41 which requires both state practice and opiniojuris.42 But
this would only apply where a number of states had acted in a consistent
manner over a period of time because they believed that they had an
obligation to do so (whether by virtue of natural law, divine law, or some
other body of ethics or law). This would be difficult in systems of
governance that predate the modern international law system, and it would
be more appropriate to consider the style of Grotius as one which uses
specific writers to support a viewpoint and provide philosophical justification
that specific ideas could be traced throughout history. But it is useful to
consider his analysis of the law of nations, as he considers it to be a statement
of what the law was at the time of writing, rather than an argument for what
the law should be.
E.

COMMON PROPERTY

An important issue that is discussed by Grotius, and which underlies the
concept that no country can own the seas, is the distinction between
common property and private property. Grotius directly describes the seas
as not being capable of private ownership (whether by an individual or
country), stating that: "in the legal phraseology of the [f]aw of [n]ations, the
sea is called indifferently the property of no one (res nullius), or a common
possession (res communis), or public property (respublica)."43 Grotius outlines

the general distinction between private property and common property,
stating that:
Now, as there are some things which every man enjoys in common with
all other men, and as there are other things which are distinctly his and
belong to no one else, just so has nature willed that some of the things
which she has created for the use of mankind remain common to all,
and that others through industry and labor of each man become his
own .44

Further, Grotius discusses the development of the concept of ownership,
and draws two conclusions in relation to common property. Firstly, he
argues that "that which cannot be occupied, or which never has been
occupied, cannot be the property of any one." 41 Secondly, he states "that all
that which has been so constituted by nature that although serving some
person it still suffices for the common use of all other persons, is today and
41. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b).
42. North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic
of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment 1969 I.C.J. Rep 3, 44.
43. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 22.

44. Id. at 2.
45. Id. at 27.
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ought in perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when it was first

created by nature."46 The important conclusion to be drawn from Grotius's
analysis is that there are things that-by their very nature-are intended to
be common property and are not capable of ownership.
F.

NATURE OF THE SEAS

To strengthen his overall argument, and as a second step to the argument
that some things are common property and incapable of ownership, it is
argued in Mare Liberum that the nature of the ocean itself provides the
justification for the freedom of navigation. Grotius states that "this right
belongs equally to all nations," and that to deny this would be to "do
violence to Nature herself."47 Grotius considers two criteria for whether
things are "by nature things open to the use of all": firstly, whether they
were produced by nature, and had never been under the sovereignty of any
48
one, and secondly, whether they were created by nature for common use.
He argues that the sea meets this criteria as it "is so limitless that it cannot
become the possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of
all."49 It is important to note that Grotius distinguishes the sea from the

shore (which is capable of ownership), as it "can neither easily be built upon,
nor inclosed."50 This will be analyzed in more detail below, where islandbuilding activities (a practice not envisioned by Grotius) are discussed. But
there was a qualification to his statement: even if there was a capability to
build (which there arguably now is as a result of technological advances), this
would not change Grotius's argument as these activities would be a
"hindrance to the general use."'51 This idea will be discussed in more detail
when analyzing specific activities in the oceans, but the important principle
is that it is the very nature of the ocean that makes it a common resource
that is incapable of being owned by a single country, and there is an ensuing
freedom of navigation for all.
G.

RECEPTION FOR GROTIUS

There was not an immediate and universal acceptance of the principle of
freedom of navigation following the publication of Mare Liberum. In fact, in
direct response to the underlying claim, John Selden, an English lawyer,
published the book that argued for the opposite idea, Mare Clausum
(translating to "Closed Sea").52 The history of these competing viewpoints,
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 28.
GROTIUS, supra

note 1, at 31.

Id.

52. JoHN

SELDEN, OF THE

DOMINION, OR OWNERSHIP, OF THE SEA:

Two
Is

FIRST IS SHEW'D, THAT THE SEA, BY THE LAW OF NATURE,OR NATIONS,

BOOKS: IN THE
NOT COMMON

TO ALL MEN, BUT CAPABLE OF PRIVATE DOMINION OR PROPRIETIE, AS WELL AS THE LAND?:
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the acceptance of the principle of freedom of navigation, and the
development of modern law of the sea have already been extensively
documented5 3 But it is important to note that it was not certain at the time
of Grotius, or even for a period of time after his work was published, that
freedom of navigation would become an accepted principle in state practice
or academic writing. Although the principle of freedom of navigation forms
a fundamental backbone for modern law of the sea, the method and style of
argument used by Grotius is not what is relied upon to justify this concept.
W.E. Butler states:
What persuaded Grotius'[s] contemporaries to make the logical leap
from evidence to conclusion was seen by later generations as
implausible, unscientific, unresponsive, or irrelevant: the founder of
modern international legal doctrine, so forward-looking in his ideas,
represented the end of an era in scholastic exposition. The ideas live on
through others, even though much in his exposition declined in
54
importance owing to his antiquated method of presenting argument.
Although the method of justification may be questioned, and there was a
clear motivation for the commission of Mare Liberum, the fundamental
principle in Grotius continues to underlie modern law of the sea: no country
may own the seas and there is a freedom of navigation for all countries55
IV.

Law of the Sea and Freedom of the High Seas

While it has been noted that "Grotius'[s] views were the commonly
accepted theory and practice for hundreds of years,"56 it must also be
accepted that modern law of the sea consists of a tension between freedom of
navigation and arguments for the various rights of states.5 7 The fundamental
tension that drives law of the sea is the question: to what extent are the seas
free? This tension will always exist. Law of the sea is in constant
development, as technology develops there will continue to be greater
IN THE SECOND IS PROVED, THAT THE DOMINION OF THE BRITISH SEA . .. IS, AND EVER

Gent trans.,
Andrew Kembe & Edward Thomas eds., 1663) (1635) (translation of MARE CLAUSUM: SEU DE
DOMINIO MAjis, LIBRI Duo).
53. See, e.g., Monica Brito Vieira, Mare Liberum vs. Mare Clausum: Grotius,Freitas,and Selden's
Debate on Dominion over the Seas, 64 J. OF THE HIST. OF IDEAS 361, 363-64 (2003); David J.
Bederman, The Sea, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
359, 359-60 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012); Robert Feenstra, HUGo GROTIUS
HATH BEEN, A PART OR APPENDANT OF THE EMPIRE OF THAT ISLAND (J.H.

1609-2009 (Jeroen Vervliet ed., 2009).
54. W. E. Butler, Grotius and the Law of the Sea, in HUGo

MARE LIBERUM
RELATIONS

55.

GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL

209, 215-16 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1990).

GROTIUS,

supra note 1, at 7-8.

56. Jan Schneider, Something Old, Something New: Some Thoughts on Grotius and the Marine
Environment, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 147, 149-50 (1977).
57. Nong Hong, Understandingthe Freedom of NavigationDoctrine and the China-US Relations in
the South China Sea, INSTITUTE FOR CHINA-AMERICAN STUDIES 1, 3 (May 2017), https://
chinaus-icas.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/FONOP-Report.pdf.
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possibilities and things that were never previously possible will require
consideration and regulation.58 This raises great difficulties for law of the
sea: if no single country may own the high seas, then no single country may
regulate the activities that are conducted there. It is therefore useful to
briefly outline some of the key law of the sea conventions, and their
provisions, in relation to freedom on the high seas, and the qualifications or
limits upon that freedom.
A.

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTIONS

When discussing modern law of the sea, it is important to refer to the four
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea: the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,59 the Convention on the Continental
Shelf,60 the Convention on the High

Seas,61

and the Convention on Fishing

and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas.62 These treaties
were concluded after the United Nations held its first Conference on the
Law of the Sea in 1958.63 Although a second Conference was held in 1960,
no further treaties were agreed on that occasion.64 The third Conference
convened in 1973, and an agreement was reached in 1982 that gave birth to
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which
came into force in 1994.65 UNCLOS is considered to be the modern
statement of law of the sea; 150 state parties have ratified the Convention,66
and the majority of the provisions are considered to be a codification of
existing customary law or a restatement of the provisions in the 1958
Conventions.67 It should be noted that UNCLOS has not been ratified by
58. Schneider, supra note 56, at 148.
59. U.N. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for signature
Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 205 (entered into force Sept. 10, 1964).
60. U.N. Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 499
U.N.T.S. 311, 311 (entered into force June 10, 1964).
61. U.N. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11,
11 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
62. U.N. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285, 285 (entered into force Mar. 20, 1966).
63. Tullio Treves, Introductory Note: 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, UNITED
(2017), http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/

NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

gclos/gclos.html.
64. Id.

65. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, CODIFICATION DIVISION
PUBLICATIONS: DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCES (2017), http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferen
ces/1973_los/.
66. ChronologicalLists of Ratificationsor, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related
Agreements,

UNITED NATIONS, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA

(Nov. 6, 2017), http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference-files/chronological lists of ratifications
.htm.

67. ANTHONY AtST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 9-10 (3d ed. 2013); Riidiger
Wolfrum, The Legal Orderfor the Seas and Oceans, in ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW OF THE
SEA CONVENTION

161, 174-75 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 1995).
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some notable countries, including the United States.68 But the provisions
that will be referred to in this paper are generally considered to be a
codification of existing customary law or a restatement of existing provisions
from the 1958 Conventions.
B.

MARITIME ZONES AND RIGHTS

One of the largest encroachments on the idea that the seas are free is the
establishment of maritime zones to protect the rights of coastal states. 69 The
first maritime zone is that closest to the coast, the territorial sea, and this
70
zone can extend up to twelve nautical miles from the relevant baselines.
Relevantly, the "sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land
territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State ... to

an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea." 71 Beyond this, and
partially overlapping, is the contiguous zone, which can extend up to twentyfour nautical miles from the relevant baselines. 72 The purpose of this zone is
to prevent and punish infringement of "customs, fiscal, immigration[,] or
sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea."73 There
has also been the establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone, which can
extend up to 200 nautical miles. 74 This zone creates sovereign rights for
"exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources,
whether living or non-living . . . for the economic exploitation and

exploration of the zone, " 75 and jurisdiction in relation to artificial islands,
marine scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the marine
environment. 76 Rights can also be claimed in relation to the continental
shelf, which is comprised of the seabed and subsoil, and the outer limits of
the continental shelf cannot exceed 350 nautical miles from the relevant
baselines.77
These zones are all distinct, with different rights based upon the proximity
to the coast, and these zones can be interpreted as a concession to coastal
states. It is important to consider the establishment of these zones, which
are a recognition and protection of coastal states rights, when considering
68. Myron H Nordquist, Why is the U.S. not a Party to UNCLOS?, INSTITUTE FOR CHINASTUDIES (Dec. 17, 2015), http://chinaus-icas.org/materials/us-not-party-unclos/;
Roncervert Ganan Almond, U.S. Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, THE DIPLOMAT
(May 24, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/u-s-ratification-of-the-law-of-the-seaconvention/.
69. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, 27 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
70. Id.
71. Id. at art. 2(1).
72. Id. at art. 33(2).
73. Id. at art. 33(1).
74. Id. at art. 57.
75. Id. at art. 56(1)(a).
76. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69, art. 56(1)(b).
77. Id. at art. 57.
AMERICA
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the principle of freedom of the seas. 78 The rights in these zones range from
an ability to exercise sovereignty (in the territorial sea), 79 to an ability to
exercise specific exclusive sovereign rights (most notably in the Exclusive
Economic Zone).80 All remaining ocean that does not fall within one of
these zones is referred to as the "high seas,"81 and is the maritime zone that
aligns with the Grotian conception that no man may own the oceans-this
zone is viewed as common to all mankind.82 Therefore, the principle of
freedom of the seas, and the idea that no country can own the oceans
because they are a common resource, still underscores modern law of the
sea. But the establishment of specific maritime zones and the recognition of
coastal state rights represents a limitation on the area where this principle
can apply. This is an ongoing tension in law of the sea-coastal states
arguing for greater exclusive rights, as balanced against the Grotian concept
that the seas should be free for all.
C.

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE

Despite the limitation in area, the protections provided in the high seas
actually exceed those envisioned by Grotius. Grotius specifically argued that
there was a freedom of navigation and freedom of fishing, and these
freedoms are provided for in the high seas. 83 But a greater number of
freedoms are explicitly provided for: freedom of overflight, freedom to lay
submarine cables and pipelines, freedom to construct artificial islands, and
freedom of scientific research.84 Additionally, the right to freedom of
navigation has been considered within the territorial sea, recalling that this is
a zone where a state exercises sovereignty. It is important to remember that
Grotius's argument was that a state was not able to exclude another state
from navigation in the ocean, however, granting states sovereignty appears
to allow exclusion from certain areas of the ocean. 85 This concern has been
addressed by establishing the right of innocent passage, 86 which allows for
navigation through the territorial sea where the passage is "continuous and
expeditious." 87 The important feature of these provisions is that the
fundamental freedom envisioned by Grotius-that freedom of navigation
shall exist for all states-is enshrined in modern law of the sea. In fact, it has
even been expanded to specifically provide for further freedoms in the high
seas, which reflect an expansion of the potential activities that can occur as a
result of technological and societal advancements.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at art. 25.
Id.
Id. at art. 56.
Id. at art. 86.

82. GROTIUS, supra note 1.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at 57.
Id. at art. 81(1)(b)()(d)(f).
GROTIUS, supra note 1, at viii.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at 30.
Id. at art. 18(2).
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CONCLUSION

Modern law of the sea still reflects the Grotian principle that the seas
should be free; it is the fundamental principle that all potential restrictions
must be balanced against. But there have been encroachments, most notably
in the establishment of specific maritime zones, which create exclusive rights
for coastal states.88 It has been argued that the principle that countries may
own, or exercise exclusive control, over the oceans, has made some "inroads"
into certain areas of law of the sea. 89 But it should be recalled that the
principle of freedom of navigation is still alive and-at least in theory-a
fundamental tenet of law of the sea, albeit restricted.90 The right to freedom
of the seas is not absolute. It will continue to be balanced against competing
rights as issues and claims arise; this is an inevitability of technological
advancement and the changing needs and desires of modern society. It is
therefore important to consider emerging and controversial issues as they
are introduced, and it is still appropriate to do this within the Grotian
conception of freedom of the seas-as this will continue to form the
opposing position in all discourse about future rights which encroach upon
this principle.

V.

Island Building

The principle that no single country can own the high seas has the
inherent effect of limiting the potential power available to countries. This is
going to be a concern for more powerful countries, as it prevents them from
obtaining the advantages that would arise if ownership or control were
permitted. An activity with the potential to infringe on the freedom of the
seas, and increase the power of states, are a collection of activities which will
be referred to as island building. The activities that will be considered
include building upon an existing maritime feature (such as a low tide
elevation or high tide elevation) to construct an island and building an island
where there is no existing maritime feature. The distinction between these
activities is important, particularly in terms of the different consequences in
law of the sea, however, they will be referred to collectively as island
building except for when it is necessary to distinguish between them. This
section of the paper will briefly discuss current activities and the response of
the international community, outline the framing of island building activities
in law of the sea, and note why this development could be concerning for the
principle of freedom of the seas.
The issue of island creation, or island building, has moved beyond the
realm of academic interest for law of the sea scholars. Recent media articles
have reflected a public interest in this issue, particularly in relation to the
extensive island building activities being conducted by China in and around
88. Id. at art. 3.
89. Schneider, supra note 56, at 150.
90. Id. at 150-51.
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the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea)' Technological advances have
resulted in these activities being conducted on a far larger scale than
previously envisioned or considered within the realm of possibility, and this
has created controversy in terms of the political response and discourse.92
The extent, purpose and ramifications of these activities are currently quite
controversial issues, and the extent of the construction is being continually
documented with photographic updates by the Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative. 93 The purpose of this paper is not to analyze the specific conduct
of China within the framework of international law of the sea. There is
existing academic commentary that addresses both sides of the issue, either
justifying or questioning China's position.94 China is not the only country
performing these activities; there are other examples of controversy based on
claims that a maritime feature has been converted into an island by artificial
means, including the controversy over Okinotorishima between Japan and
China. 95 But the activities of China are the most notable as a current issue
that needs to be addressed, and will be the example referred to when
considering the response of the international community to island building.
This selection is the result of the scale and extent of the conduct, and the
controversial location of the activities in an area of water disputed by
multiple countries, namely the South China Sea.
Considering the unprecedented nature of these activities, it is important
to reflect upon the response of the international community. The most
authoritative legal statement in this regard has been the ruling in the South
China Sea Arbitration,96 proceedings brought by the Philippines against
91. See, e.g., Derek Watkins, What China Has Been Budiding in the South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-hasbeen-building-in-the-south-china-sea-2016.html; Matthew Pennington, As Tensions Ease, China
Keeps Building on Disputed Islands, MILITARY TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.militarytimes
.com/flashpoints/2017/12/15/as-tensions-ease-china-keeps-building-on-disputed-islands//;
Dan Southerland, China's New Island-Building Ship Raises the Stakes in South China Sea, RADIO
FREE AsiA (Nov. 10, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/china-ship- 1110201715
3948.html.
92. Southerland, supra note 91.
93. China land Tracker, AsiA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, https://amti.csis.org/
island-tracker/china/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
94. See, e.g., BEN DOLVEN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44072, CHINESE LAND
RECLAMATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS 1, 1-2 (2015);
Bernard H. Oxman, The South China Sea Arbitration Award, 24 U. MAMI INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 235, 281 (2017); Mira Rapp-Hooper, Patting the South China Sea: How to Uphold the Rule of
Law, 95 FOREIGN AFF. 76, 78-79 (2016); Stefan Talmon, The South China Sea Arbitration:
Observations on the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 15 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 309, 323-25
(2016).
95. Andrew L. Silverstein, Okinotorishima: Artificial Preservation of a Speck of Sovereignty, 16
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 409, 420-21 (1990); Guifang Xue, How Much Can a Rock Get - A Reflection

from the Okinotorishima Rocks, 2011

CHINA OCEANS

L.

REV.

1, 4-8 (2011).

96. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19 (PCA Case Repository
2015) [hereinafter South China Sea Jurisdiction]; South China Sea Arbitration (Phil v. China),
Case No. 2013-19, 1,7 (PCA Case Repository 2016) [hereinafter South China Sea Arbitration
Award].
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China in relation to various activities in the South China Sea, including
island building and reclamation. But the scope of the decision was
intentionally narrow as a result of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.97 The
Tribunal did not, and could not, address the question of sovereignty for the
various maritime features in question.98 The specific question addressed was
the classification of various maritime features (and consequent maritime
entitlements), an issue that the Tribunal found it could decide without
determining which country had sovereignty over those features. 99 The
Tribunal found that a country could not claim a maritime entitlement that
extended beyond the limits imposed by UNCLOS, and specifically found
that none of the features in the Spratly Islands met the criteria of being an
'island' under UNCLOS, and therefore could not generate an exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) or continental shelf. 1
Although China rejected the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and did not make
submissions (either written or oral), the Chinese position was outlined in a
Position Paper that sought to justify both their activities in the South China
Sea and their rejection of the Tribunal's jurisdiction.10 There has also been
a strong response from the international community disputing the activities
in the South China Sea and Chinese claims supporting these activities and
claiming rights or control of waters outside of the limits of their entitlements
under UNCLOS.102 This includes both the parties that are actively involved
in the dispute in the South China Sea,103 as well as statements about law of
the sea from other interested parties, including the United States and
Australia.104 The position of the United States is arguably weakened by the
fact that it is arguing in relation to provisions of UNCLOS, when it is not a
party to that Convention.10 But as noted earlier, the provisions relied upon
are considered to be customary international law, and therefore binding
97.
98.
note
99.

South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 96, at 1-2.
South China Sea Jurisdiction, supra note 96, at 15; South China Sea ArbitrationAward, supra
96, at 1-2.
South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 96, at 1-2.

100. Id. at 254.
101. PositionPaperof the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of urisdiction in
the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, 15 CHINESE J. OF INT.
L. 431 (Aug. 12, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jmw024.

102. Michael McDevitt, 'The South China Sea: Assessing US Polity and Options for the Future',
CNA (Nov. 2014), https://www.cna.org/cna-files/pdf/JOP-2014-U-009109.pdf
103. See, e.g., Felipe Villamor, Philippines Sends Defense Chief to Disputes South China Sea Iland,
NEW YORK TIMES

(Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/2 1/world/asia/philip

pines-south-china-sea.html; Laura Zhou, China-Vietnam Maritime Tensions Flare as Foreign
Ministers Meeting Called Off, SOULTH

CHINA

MORNING POST (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.scmp

.com/news/china/diplomacy- defence/article/2 10 5828/china-vietnam-maritime-tensions -flareforeign-ministers.
104. McDevitt, supra note 102; 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, at 46-47 (Nov. 2017), https:/

/www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/file/265 1/download?token=Q5 CYuX29.
105. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
314

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 52, NO. 2

upon all countries.106 The various arguments for and against the Chinese
claims, and shaping the discourse in relation to island building, will be
considered in section VI, when analyzing these arguments within the
framework of Grotius' conception of freedom of the seas.
To understand the potential consequences of island building activities
within the current law of the sea regime, it is useful to outline the
classification of maritime features within UNCLOS.107 The important
consequence of this classification results from the maritime entitlement (or
maritime zone) that each feature is capable of generating.08 The first
important distinction is whether a feature is a low tide elevation or a high
tide elevation: a low tide elevation being above water at low tide but
submerged at high tide, whereas a high tide elevation is above water at both
low and high tide.109 A low tide elevation is not capable of generating a
territorial sea, EEZ, or continental shelf,110 but may be used as a baseline
where it is located within the territorial sea of a state." A low tide elevation
is not capable of being artificially transformed into a high tide elevation
under the UNCLOS regime, as a high tide elevation must be "naturally
formed" above water at high tide.112
Where a maritime feature is above water at high tide, there are two
possible classifications; the feature may be a "rock" or an "island"." 3 The
difference between these features is important, as an island is capable of
generating a territorial sea, a contiguous zone, an EEZ, and a continental
shelf," 4 whereas a rock can only generate a territorial sea and contiguous
zone." 5 The distinction is based on the definition in UNCLOS, which
states that rocks "cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own,"116 and conversely means that an island must be able to sustain human
habitation or an economic life of its own. Although it's unlikely, in a
practical sense, that one will be fulfilled without the other being present, it
has been determined that only one of the criterion must be satisfied for the
feature to be considered an island." 7 It is this distinction that raises the
critical question: whether a rock can be converted into an island by human
alteration, as the feature is already a "naturally formed" high tide elevation.
106. Meagan P. Wilder, Who Gets the Oil?: Arctic Energy Exploration in Uncertain Waters and the
Need for Universal Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 32 HoLs. J.
INT'L L. 505, 541-42 (2010).
107. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69.
108. Id. sec. 2.
109. Id. at art. 13(1).
110. Id. at art. 13(2).
111. Id. at art. 13(1).
112. Id.
113. Id. at art. 121.
114. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at art. 121(2).
115. Id. at art. 121(3).
116. Id.
117. South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 96, at 209.
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This issue is important because of the difference in maritime entitlements
and will be discussed in greater detail in the analysis in section VI.
A state is also permitted to construct a wholly artificial island within their
EEZ, 118 and on their continental shelf." 9 But an artificial island will not
generate any maritime zones, and the only claim that can be made is for a
500m safety zone. 20 Where a state constructs an artificial island in the high
seas, there will be serious questions as to exclusive jurisdiction because "[n]o
State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty."2' It is therefore important to distinguish between whether the
specific island building referred to is construction upon an existing maritime
feature and capable of generating an entitlement, or is purely artificial and
therefore not capable of creating any maritime entitlements.122 Even where
the classification of a maritime feature and the consequent maritime
entitlement is determined or agreed, there will still be a relevant question as
to the sovereignty over those features.23 The law of the sea regime
specifically does not address the issue of sovereignty over land territory, but
this will be a relevant issue to consider in terms of international relations and
international law generally.24
Island building activities potentially pose a threat to the fundamental
freedom of the seas; they can be a means for more powerful and wellresourced countries to encroach upon areas of the sea they do not have
entitlement to under UNCLOS. As technology has developed, this threat
has become a more realistic possibility, and island building activities are
already being performed.125 In particular, the legal consequences of the
large-scale activities in the South China Sea-a highly contested area-will
need to be addressed within the framework of law of the sea. 26 The
potential consequences of these activities are numerous. First, constructing
an island provides potential strategic advantages in terms of expanding land
127
territory, which may increase the power and military capability of a state.
Secondly, where a feature is determined to be an island under the UNCLOS
118. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at art. 60.
119. Id. at art. 80.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at art. 60(4)-(5), art. 80.
Id. at art. 89.
Id. at art. 60.
Id. at art. 89.
See generally U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69.

125. Seth Robson, China Quietly Continues Iland-Building Campaign as Tensions Ease in South

China Sea,

STARS AND STRIPES

(Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.stripes.com/news/china-quietly-

continues -island-building-campaign-as-tensions -ease -in-south-china-sea- 1.50252.
126. Daniel Mooney, Lack of a Legal FrameworkRegardingIsland Building in the South China Sea,
MICH. J. INT'L L. 37.
127. Peter Pham, The Arms Race in the South China Sea, FORBES (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www
•forbes.com/sites/peterpham/2017/12/20/the -arms-race -in-the-south-china-sea/#696218 bd4b
la; Seth Robson, China Island-Building Continues in South China Sea, MILITARY (Dec. 16, 2017),
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/12/16/china-island-building-goes-tensions-easesouth-china-sea.html.
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regime, it will be capable of generating both a territorial sea and an EEZ up
to 200 nautical miles.128 Thirdly, exclusive control over the Spratly Islands
may influence all future negotiations about sovereignty and maritime
delimitation in the South China Sea.129 Fourthly, the pragmatic reality is
that the risk of environmental damage, or harm to the biodiversity of the
region, will be significantly increased by such large-scale construction
activities. 30 Additionally, and important for the purpose of this paper, these
activities could be viewed as a means of circumventing the Grotian principle
of freedom of the seas, and raise questions about the continuing relevance of
this principle in modern law of the sea.
VI.

Grotian Analysis of Island Building

The following critique builds upon the previous discussion of background
and context, the analysis of legal principle and development, and the
description of the current factual scenario and concerns. Island building
activities are now able to be undertaken on a scale not envisioned at the time
of Grotius, or even as recently as the negotiation of the provisions in the
UNCLOS.'3' This is a new development; it raises controversial issues and
represents an unsettled area of law at the fringe of the settled body of law
codified within UNCLOS. It also raises larger conceptual issues about the
role of the Grotian principle-freedom of the seas-in the context of modern
law of the sea generally. The underlying question must be asked: does island
building represent a shift away from one of the fundamental propositions
that modern law of the sea was built upon?
This broad theme will be explored by discussing a series of smaller
questions. The first question is whether the current island building activities
actually do represent a shift, or seek to be a shift, away from the concept of
freedom of the seas. This will involve analyzing the response of the
international community, as well as considering the stance taken by China
and their justification for these activities within the current law of the sea
regime. The second question is theoretical, and is whether these activities
have the potential to conceptually represent a shift from freedom of the seas,
or are simply a further restriction in line with qualifications previously
granted in favor of recognizing state rights. The paper will then consider
the consequences based on both potential views: that it is only an isolated
qualification to the freedom, or that it represents a desire in the international
community for a fundamental shift in the law of the sea. The third question
is based on the former view, that this is only an isolated qualification, and
considers whether this restriction is justified in contrast to the competing
right to freedom of the high seas. The fourth question is based on the view
that this represents a fundamental shift, or a momentum towards such a
128.
129.
130.
131.

See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at art. 57.
Mooney, supra note 126.
South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 96, at 475-76.
See generally U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69.
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change, and questions whether it is appropriate to reconsider this
fundamental principle in light of developments in technology and
international relations, or if there is an overriding need to preserve the
principle of freedom of the seas. By considering and answering these smaller
questions, the larger conceptual issues raised by island building can be
answered within the Grotian conception of freedom of the seas.
A.

Do

CURRENT ACTIVITIES INDICATE A DESIRE FOR A

FUNDAMENTAL

SHIFT IN LAW OF

THE SEA?

The first thing to consider is the nature and consequences of the specific
conduct being undertaken: do the activities in question, and the attitude of
the international community more generally, indicate a shift in thinking
about freedom of the seas? Answering this question involves discussion from
two different sides: that of the international community, in response to the
island building activities, and that of China, when justifying such conduct
under the law of the sea regime. Whether this new practice is accepted by
other countries as legitimate under law of the sea, and the rationale for any
such acceptance, will largely determine if this represents a fundamental
change in law of the sea. It has already been noted in this paper that the
extensive island building activities have received a negative reaction from the
international community, ranging from concern to condemnation. But it is
important to look at why these activities are receiving negative scrutiny: is it
because of the underlying conceptual concern in relation to freedom of the
seas, a theoretical debate about the law of the sea, or is it framed within
another discourse?
The statements and actions of the international community in response to
these activities indicate that the concern is not primarily focused on
conceptual principle, or a strict legal debate, but is about broader political
concerns. 132 This is primarily being framed as an issue about the growth of
China's power and military interests33 At the beginning of 2017, U.S.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that: "We're going to have to send
China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your
access to those islands also is not going to be allowed."' 34 The discussion has
even moved to whether a response against Chinese activities will initiate a
132. See Mark J Valencia, Beiing Now Calls the Shots in the South China Sea, and the US and
ASEANMust Accept this for Lasting Peace, SOUTH CHINA MONING POST (July 9, 2017), http://
www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2101696/beijing-now-calls-shots-southchina-sea-and-us-and-asean.
133. China Builds New Military Facilitieson South China Sea Islands: Think Tank, REUTERS (June
29, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-islands/china-builds-newmilitary- facilities -on-south-china-sea-islands -think-tank-idUSKBN19L02J; Valencia, supra
note 132.
134. David Brunnstrom & Matt Spetalnick, Tillerson Says China Should Be Barredfrom South

China Sea Llands, REUTERS QJan. 11, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congresstillerson-china/tillerson-says-china-should-be-barred-from-south-china-sea-islands-idUSKBN
14V2KZ.
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large scale war in the South China Sea, 13 and "freedom of navigation"
patrols are being conducted within twelve nautical miles of the artificial
islands to demonstrate the stance of the international community that these
activities are not legitimate or legal.136 This is not an academic discussion
about provisions of UNCLOS, or a conceptual debate; it is now a political
issue about power, growth, and military, and this indicates broader concerns
from the international community than strict law of the sea issues.
Additionally, the states bordering the South China Sea, notably the
Philippines and Vietnam, are concerned about the infringement upon their
own claims to maritime entitlements, the effect on their ships and fishing,
137
and the environmental consequences of their actions.
Considering this negative response from states directly affected, such as
countries bordering the South China Sea, and states not directly involved in
the disputed area, it is important to consider the stance that has been taken
by China. China has continued to argue that they are acting in conformity
with the law of the sea. 138 In particular, they have argued that they are
entitled to a portion of the sea enclosed by a line referred to as the ninedash-line, based on historical rights.39 This claim was specifically addressed
by the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration, who determined that a
state cannot claim an entitlement greater than that provided for by
UNCLOS, and that China was not entitled to claim these waters. 40 But the
most important aspect of the Chinese justification and stance is the lack of
engagement with the law; China did not engage with the Tribunal after
claiming that they did not have jurisdiction, and maintained this stance even
135. See Alexander L Vuving, How America Can Take Control in the South China Sea, FOREIGN
POLICY (Feb. 13, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/13/how-the-u-s-can-take-controlin-the-south-china-sea; James Holmes, How China Plans to Win a War in the South China Sea,
NATIONAL INTEREST

(Aug. 27, 2017), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-china-

plans -win-war-the-south-china-sea-22073; Naomi Woodley, South China Sea: *ThereCannot Be'
Conflict Between US and China, Foreign Minister Warns, ABC (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.abc
.net.au/news/2017 -02 -08/us- china-conflict-on-south- china-sea-not-good-warns- foreign-mini/

8249812.
136. See Prashanth Paremeswaran, US South China Sea Policy After the Ruling: Opportunitiesand

Challenges, BROOKINGS INST. (July 22, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/u-s-southchina-sea-policy-after-the-ruling-opportunities-and-challenges; Idrees Mi, US Destroyer
Challenges China's Claims in South China Sea, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-usa-china-southchinasea-exclusive/u-s-destroyer- challenges- chinas -claims -insouth-china-sea-idUSKBN1AQOYK.
137. See Jeffrey Bader et al., Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug.
14, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp -content/uploads/20 16/06/south- china -seaperspective-bader-lieberthal-mcdevitt.pdf; Commodore Agus Rustandi, The South China Sea
Dispute: Opportunitiesfor ASEAN to Enhance its Policies in Orderto Achieve Resolution, AtSTRALIAN
DEFENCE

COLLEGE

(Apr. 2016), http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/

RustandiIPSP.pdf.
138. Huaxia, Full Text of Chinese Government Statement on China's TerritorialSovereignty and
Maritime Rights and Interests in South China Sea, XINHUA (Dec. 7, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet
.com/english/2016-07/12/c 135 507754.htm.
139. South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 96, at 71-74.
140. Id. at 116-17.
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after the Tribunal issued the initial judgment on jurisdiction.141 This raises
concerns about whether this issue is going to be discussed within the
framework of law of the sea or is simply a matter of power politics where
both sides seek to use legal discourse as a means of justifying their position.
But this is an inherent feature of international law; there is no supreme
authority that can enforce a body of law, and thus international law will have
to be viewed as only one part of a broader discussion about international
relations. Even though China is unlikely to accept the award of the South
China Sea Arbitration, the value of the decision may be more properly
realized in terms of its impact and influence on the future relations and
negotiations between various countries.142 Consideration of the influence of
power politics on international law, and the appropriateness of such
influence, is a much broader issue than contemplated by this paper. For the
purpose of this discussion, it is assumed that there is no clear demarcation
between international law and international politics. With that concept in
mind, it can reasonably be concluded that this issue does not represent a
conceptual shift in thinking about the law of the sea, but instead it represents
an issue of self-interest for states. China is acting to increase their power
and capabilities, both military and strategic.43 Other countries are
responding based on protecting their own interests, either because China is
directly infringing on their rights (including the disputed maritime
entitlements of coastal states and more general concerns about freedom of
navigation), or they are concerned about an increase in China's power
posing a threat to their country. 144 Either way, these specific activities should
not serve as evidence that a fundamental shift in thinking about law of the
sea is being contemplated by the international community.
B.

IF ACCEPTED AS A LEGITIMATE PRACTICE, WOULD ISLAND
BUILDING REPRESENT A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN LAW OF
THE SEA OR SIMPLY A FURTHER LEGITIMATE
QUALIFICATION OR LIMITATION?

The concept of freedom of the seas, and the principle that no country may
own the high seas, inherently means that the regulation of the oceans is an
international issue and requires a functioning body of international law to
141. Tom Phillips, Beiing rejects tribunal's ruling in South China Sea case, SOUTH CHINA SEA
(July 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-southchina-sea-case -against-china.
142. See Clive Schofield, Explainer: WfVhat are the Legal Implications of the South China Sea Ruling?,
THE CONVERSATION (July 13,

2016), http://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-the-legal-

implications-of-the-south-china-sea-ruling-62421.
143. Patrick Cronin, Toward a New Maritime Strategy inthe South China Sea, THE DEBATE (June
22, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/toward-a-new-maritime-strategy-in-the-southchina-sea/.
144. Lynn Kuok, Countering China'sactions in the South China Seas, IISS, (Aug. 16, 2018), https:/
/www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/08/countering-china-south-china-sea.
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establish rules for all countries. 145 If island building were accepted as a
legitimate practice, then it has the potential to function as a method for
states to use artificial means to obtain more land territory, and consequently
obtain control over surrounding portions of the ocean. The acceptance of
China's conduct and stance could result in a transformation from the need to
regulate the oceans as a common resource for all of mankind, to a
battleground where states seek to obtain more territory, influence, and
power. Although it has not directly been stated as the policy objective of
China, the practice of allowing states to have exclusive control or ownership
over the oceans is more in line with the principle within Mare Clausum.146
This raises conceptual concerns, as it has been the opposing principle, within
Mare Liberum, that has been the commonly accepted practice for hundreds
147
of years and forms a fundamental pillar of law of the sea.
It should be recalled that the opposing arguments put forward by Grotius
and Selden were based on the self-interest of their respective countries at the
time, using conceptual justification to support their overall position. This
raises the question of whether we are currently revisiting this conceptual
debate within the framework of a new factual matrix. There are two ways to
consider this question or issue. The first is to treat this as simply another
debate about an encroachment or limitation on freedom of the seas, in favor
of recognition of state rights. This is a continual debate that is necessary
within law of the sea every time there is a new development that raises
questions about the existing tension between freedom of the seas and
exclusive state rights. But there is a second way to interpret this issue:
although it is not being directly stated as the objective, it could be viewed as
only one in a series of encroachments on the high seas that represents a
gradual and ongoing long-term shift away from the principle of freedom of
the seas. This must be considered carefully, as revisiting this fundamental
proposition will require a complete overhaul of existing law of the sea-a
body of law that is premised on the concept of freedom of the seas and works
to regulate an area that is not owned by any single state. 148 Both of these
questions will be addressed below: discussing the validity of island building
as a discrete limitation on freedom of the seas, as well as the appropriateness
of re-conceptualizing law of the sea without the fundamental principle of
freedom of the seas.

145. United Nations, Oceans and the Law of the Sea,

GLOBAL ISSUES,

http://www.un.org/en/

sections/issues-depth/oceans-and-law-sea/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
146. See Bo Johnson Theutenberg, Mare Clausum et Mare Liberum, ARTIC INST. OF N.
(Dec. 1984), https://www.jstor.org/stable/40510310?seq=l#metadata info tab con
tents.
147. Id.
AMERICA

148. See generally U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69.
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As A DISCRETE ISSUE, IS ISLAND BUILDING A JUSTIFIED
LIIITATION ON FREEDOM OF THE SEAS?

It has already been noted that entrenched within law of the sea is an
underlying tension between freedom of the seas and the recognition of
coastal state rights; this issue is not unique, and it was the finding of a
balance between these competing rights that formed the foundation of the
modern law of the sea. 149 XVhether island building is a practice that should
constitute a justified limitation on freedom of the sea will largely depend on
how the issue is framed within existing law of the sea. If these islands are
considered to be artificial islands, the only relevant maritime entitlement will
be the 500m safety zone. 150 The more relevant question will then be one of
land territory, an issue not addressed by law of the sea and more properly
considered within general international law.'5' It is accepted that land
dominates the sea, 52 meaning that the maritime entitlement will follow the
sovereignty over the land. The relevant principle within law of the sea is
that no country may claim sovereignty over the high seas, and this practice
has the potential to circumvent that.53 WAhere a state creates a purely
artificial island, the issue of sovereignty will be determined by other areas of
international law and is not an issue apt to be addressed within law of the
sea. 154 The relevant observation about artificial islands within the law of the
sea regime is that they are not capable of claiming a territorial sea or EEZ
with exclusive rights for the state and are therefore not a means of capturing
large portions of the oceans for exclusive state control. 55
The larger issue will be whether a state is capable of transforming an
existing maritime feature. Although the wording of UNCLOS suggests that
a low tide elevation could not be artificially transformed into an island, as it
would not be naturally formed above the high tide, the more significant
question is whether a rock can be transformed into an island, as both terms
are defined under UNCLOS.56 Despite the Tribunal in the South China Sea
Arbitration unambiguously stating that a rock cannot be converted into an
island, as a maritime feature must be assessed as naturally formed,5 7 this
issue is likely to remain controversial between states seeking to justify
further exclusive maritime rights. Given the clarity of the wording in the
South China Sea Arbitration, unless the law is further clarified or revisited, the
appropriate practice will continue to be to assess the development of specific
149. United Nations, supra note 145.
150. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at art. 60.
151. See generally, U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69.
152. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 1, 140
(Dec. 13); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (No. 16) (Bangl. v.
Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS Rep. 4, 185.
153. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at art. 89.
154. Id. at art. 60.
155. Id.
156. Id. at arts. 13, 121.
157. South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 96, at 214.
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features on a case-by-case basis, considering the location, natural state, and
transformation for each feature in question.158 It is important to note that
this is conceptually different than creating land territory where none
previously existed. This is the concern in relation to island building: that it
will grant land territory and maritime entitlements where there previously
were none. 159 In the case of purely artificial islands, the establishment of
exclusive maritime rights (with the exception of the safety zone) is not
permissible under law of the sea. 60 Island building activity is concerning
because it involves construction activities in an area that is-as a fundamental
6
principle of law of the sea-not permitted to be owned by one country.' '
This is concerning and will require clarification within international law if it
comes to be seen as a permissible and legitimate activity. It will then
become an issue of determining the best means of regulating this practice to
balance the tension and ensure that freedom of the seas is protected.
D.

Do

WE NEED TO RECONSIDER FREEDOM OF THE SEAS?

It has been established in this section that the specific issue of island
building is not a purely conceptual debate about the relevance of freedom of
the seas: is it an issue about states acting in their self-interest to increase
their power or, conversely, seeking to ensure that their rights are not
infringed upon and to limit the growth of other states? But it raises a valid
conceptual concern about whether this is a sign that a powerful nation is
seeking to exercise power by establishing dominion over valuable parts of the
seas. This is not the first time that this has happened; the publication of
Mare Liberum was in direct response to an argument from a powerful
country that the seas were not, in fact, free.162 In that sense, the response to
these complex issues is actually simple: this is why we needed, and will
continue to need, freedom of the seas. There will always be a desire for
more powerful states to seek to monopolize areas of the sea that are
beneficial to them. It is in their self-interest, and it can be seen as acceptable
or even necessary as an obligation that leaders have to the citizens of their
country to act in their self-interest. 163 But this is also why the concept-even
if purely theoretical-that underlies international law is that of sovereign
equality.64 The more powerful states are theoretically not able to control
the weaker states simply by virtue of their power.
158. Id. at 214-15.
159. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at art. 60.
160. Id.
161. Id. at art. 89.

162. See Peter Borschberg, Hugo Grotius' Theory of Trans-Oceanic Trade Regulation: Reviting
Mare Liberum (1609) 1 (Int. L. and Justice, Working Paper No. 14, 2005).
163. Harold Hongju Koh, Wby Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2611
(1997).
164. Juliane Kokott, States, Sovereign Equality, OXFORD PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://
opil.ouplaw.com/view/10. 1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-eli13
(last
updated Apr. 2011).
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In practice, this is more controversial and the relationship between
developing and powerful states was noted earlier in this paper. But freedom
of the seas needs to be maintained as a fundamental tenet of law of the sea
because it acts as a protection against the more powerful nations seeking to
monopolize the seas for their own benefit. The concept of the oceans as a
common resource was noted in Grotius and, although his justification
through the use of natural and divine law may be questioned as legitimate in
modern society, his overall argument is still relevant.165 We continue to rely
on the seas to travel between and trade with other countries.166 The seas are
distinct from the land: although they can be built upon, this is simply the
creation of further land territory, which will not be governed by law of the
sea.16 The seas are a natural resource distinct from the land, which is
capable of ownership, and it is required for all peoples to be able to travel,
trade, and utilize for their own benefit.
Accepting that the nature of the oceans and the need to enshrine a
protection against the more powerful states monopolizing them justifies
maintaining a freedom of the seas, the relevant question becomes how we
should use the law to maintain this fundamental freedom of the seas, when
the situation is more reflective of a power-politic situation within
international relations. But this issue is not confined to island building, or
even to the law of the sea as a body of law. This is an inherent problem
faced by international law and will continue to be a conceptual topic that
needs to be addressed. In this case, a relevant example is the decision of the
South China Sea Arbitration.68 It has already been directly stated by China
that they do not recognize the decision, but that was clear from the
beginning of the arbitration, and yet the Philippines continued to pursue this
matter through the international law process. 69 The advantage that comes
from this decision will not be a legal advantage as enforced by a top down
system; it will be an advantage in how the decision can be used in a
horizontal based legal system with no controlling authority. The statement
of international law can be viewed as part of a larger negotiation tactic in
international relations, and as a tool in diplomacy and political discussion.
By preserving the principle of freedom of the seas, we ensure that all future
action in relation to the law of the sea has to be measured and justified
against this principle-and that is the protection that the principle of freedom
of the seas provides within international law of the sea.

165. See generally Borschberg, supra note 162.
166. How much trrade transitsthe South China Sea?,

CHINA POWER,

https://chinapower.csis.org/

much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
167. See generally U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69.
168. See generally South China Sea ArbitrationAward, supra note 96.

169. Id.
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When Grotius outlined the principle of freedom of the seas in Mare
Liberum, he established the principle that would form one of the
fundamental pillars of modern law of the sea. 170 It is the continuing limiting
principle that all future action and potential encroachments must be
measured against, and that is the value of his work. Grotius gave great
thought to the idea of regulating relations between nations, and regulating
an international society more generally; both of these ideas were reflected in
his writings. 17 But it is important to contextualize the particular work that
this freedom was first outlined in; Mare Liberum was written with a
particular purpose and to provide support for the position of one side in a
legal dispute between two powerful states.'72 This is the continuing theme
surrounding the oceans; they are an area where more powerful states will
continue to desire and seek greater power. By conceptualizing the high seas
as an area in which no state has control, this inherently creates a power
vacuum. This is the importance of freedom of the seas as a fundamental
principle-it ensures that no state can take control to the exclusion of other
states. To revisit this principle would open a battleground to be divided as a
means of increasing state power and influence, and be to the detriment of all
other countries who currently benefit from the freedoms protected on the
high seas.
It is this principle that all future actions must be measured against, and
this is the case for the controversial activity of island building. The concept
was considered when UNCLOS was established, and this is why there is a
provision that specifically addresses artificial islands.' 73 What was not
considered was the scale of these activities, as technological developments
have resulted in these activities being far more extensive than ever previously
contemplated. The positioning and scale of these activities raises the
legitimate concern that island building will be used as a means of obtaining
advantages and control in strategic locations, effectively extending the
influence and power of countries where they previously did not have any
exclusive control. But, the response of the international community to these
activities has indicated that countries do not accept this practice as
legitimate.' r4 Even if all parties involved are acting in their self-interest, and
not based on a conceptual discussion removed from reality, this further
serves to reinforce why we need this principle. All countries agreeing to
170. James Brown Scott, Hugo GrotiusThe freedom of the Seas, 1609, UNIV. OF MASS.
(1916), http://wwwl.umassd.edu/euro/resources/dutchrep/4.pdf (last visited Oct.
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171. Id.
172. Borschberg, supra note 162.
173. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 69, at art. 60.
174. David Brunnstrom & Matt Spetalnick, Tillerson Says China Should Be Barredfrom South
China Sea Ilands, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congresstillerson-china/tillerson-says-china-should-be-barred-from-south-china-sea-islands-idUSKBN
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respect the principle of freedom of the seas serves as a means of protecting
against the self-interest of any one state resulting in control of the oceans.
Although it means that no state can obtain the advantage for itself, it ensures
that no other country can obtain that advantage, and that is likely to be the
motivating factor that ensures that this principle is preserved. Island
building is a controversial issue, and the specific conduct will need to be
discussed further within an international law framework, but it does not
represent a signaling of the end of freedom of the seas. There is a selfinterest for all states to protect this freedom. It can be difficult to
conceptualize freedom of the seas as a common resource for all rather than a
power vacuum waiting to be captured. But the very fact that the majority of
countries will not allow a single country to take control-a fact highlighted in
the analysis of island building in the South China Sea-is what will ensure
that this principle remains a fundamental tenet of law of the sea.
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